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THE EMERGING LAW OF THE DIGITAL




Now, natural laws which are followed by all nations alike,
deriving from divine providence, remain always constant and
immutable: but those which each state establishes for itself
are liable to frequent change whether by the tacit consent of
the people or by subsequent legislation.'
Every law or rule ... is a command .... Every positive law,
or every law simply and strictly so called, is set... by a
sovereign person or body, to a member or members of the
independent political society wherein that person or body is
sovereign or supreme.'
This program has performed an illegal operation and will be
shut down.3
I. INTRODUCTION
Apart from the constraints and protocols of the written
word-including some necessary expansion and elabora-
tion-this paper is a faithful record of my remarks at the
Brooklyn Law School symposium memorialized in this issue of
the Journal. Although those remarks were intended as an
Anglo-Australian intervention in the essentially trans-Atlantic
discourse between the two panels that made up the morning
session, their substance is less geographically constrained than
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; formerly Senior Lecturer in Law,
Monash University, Melbourne Australia; LL.B. (Hons.) Makerere University;
LL.M., Ph.D. Monash University, Melbourne, Australia.
1. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY 6
(J.A.C. Thomas 1975)
2. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE
USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 13, 253-54 (1954).
3. Common computer program error message (emphasis added).
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might appear at first blush. At one level, the theme of these
remarks, like that of the symposium itself, really consists of
two prongs of the nascent law of transactions involving what I
have called the "digital domain:" the first prong is that of
transactions involving digital products; the second is that of
digital transactions which may or may not involve digital prod-
ucts. These two prongs are the subjects of two respective legis-
lative initiatives in the United States-the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act4 (UCITA) for the first prong, and
the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act5 (UETA) for the sec-
ond.
Although they effect fundamental changes, these legisla-
tive initiatives are sometimes characterized as just an effort to
systematize or reconfigure transactional law into a form use-
able in the digital environment,6 but the vigorous worldwide
debate which has surrounded these initiatives-especially
UCITA-indicates that there is much more at stake here than
mere systematization or adaptation. This paper suggests that
what is at stake is no less than the very foundations of an
emerging law of the digital domain. In the context of software
licensing, that law consists of three interlocking components:
contract, intellectual property, and increasingly, the law-like
architectural features and protocols of that domain.7
4. Formerly Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code.
5. Both UCITA and UETA were approved and recommended for enactment
by all states at the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) at its Annual Meeting in Denver, Colorado, July 23-30, 1999.
6. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and Contract Law-What Law Applies to
Transactions in Information, 36 HOus. L. REv. 1, 3 (1999):
We have experienced a fundamental shift from a goods-based economy to
one a substantial part of which entails distribution of digital information
and services. The contract law developed in the 1940's and 1950's to
accommodate sales of toasters, automobiles, and other wares, while ade-
quate for those purposes, does not correspond to the commercial premises
relevant to contracts for licensed access to a digital database, for multi-
location use of network or communications software, or for access to, or
use of, other information assets.
Id. at 3.
The prize for the understatement, however, goes to the Australian Government's
advisory body on copyright law issues, the Copyright Law Review Committee
(CLRC) which released a ground-breaking report (dealing with some fundamental
aspects of Australian copyright law) under the title: Simplification of the Copyright
Act 1968!
7. For an excellent and readable general account of how cyberspace can be
and ought to be regulated, see generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER
CONTRACT/IP INTERFACE
In this regard, the amusing error message that says "this
program has performed an illegal operation and will be shut
down" makes an unintended ironic hint at the law-like com-
mands emanating from computer networks. To the legal theo-
rist, these law-like commands present another intriguing twist:
they look like the ultimate rapprochement between natural
law and legal positivism since they seem to be a unified em-
bodiment of both. They are a kind of "natural law" in that they
are built into the very nature or architecture of the digital
domain; but they are equally the legal positivist's law par
excellence both in their complete immunity to the beckonings of
policy or morality and in their reliance on swift and imperson-
al retribution ("Your program will be shut down!").
I shall leave these intriguing theoretical questions to an-
other occasion. In the rest of this paper, I explore, from an
Anglo-Australian perspective, the issues relating to the licens-
ing of digital products and the digital licensing of all products
against the background of the emerging law of the digital do-
main. In Part II, I discuss the Anglo-Australian intervention in
the American/European debate on these issues, and why it
provides an instructive third perspective. Part III then discuss-
es Australia's ambitious legislative agenda and its role in the
overall regulation of the digital domain. Part IV briefly dis-
cusses the possible collusion of intellectual property contract
and code in the creation of the new law of the digital domain,
and Part V consists of concluding remarks on the resulting
dramatic reconfiguration of the intellectual property cultures of
America, Europe and Australia.
II. AN ANGLO-AUSTRALIAN INTERVENTION IN A TRANS-
ATLANTIC DEBATE
A. The Value of an Anglo-Australian Perspective
As Professor Dessemontet's paper and Professor
Hugenholtz's comment on it in this issue vividly demonstrate,8
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Graham Greenleaf, An Endnote on Regulating
Cyberspace: Architecture vs. Law?, 21 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. (1998).
8. See Franqois Dessemontet, The European Approach to E-Commerce and
Licensing, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 59 (2000); P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright, Con-
tract and Code: What Will Remain of the Public Domain?, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
77 (2000).
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Europe and the United States provide contrasting images of
intellectual property and legal culture in general. I suggest
that Australia supplies a third image that is similar in some
respects but different in other respects. The similarities with
Europe derive, in part, from certain common assumptions
about intellectual property embodied in international treaties
such as the premier copyright treaty, the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works.' With the Unit-
ed Kingdom and the United States the affinity also comes from
sharing the common law tradition. The similarities are also a
distinctive feature of globalization'0 and the gradual shift
from the previous era of an inter-national intellectual property
culture, largely predicated upon different territorial standards
and the doctrine of national treatment, to a culture that in-
creasingly demands deep integration and the adoption by all
states of universal minimum standards, procedures and reme-
dies for the protection of intellectual property."
On the other hand, Australia presents a contrasting image
to both Europe and the United States as a smaller but highly
developed country with a dynamic and responsive legal system
that has pushed it to the forefront of international norm-cre-
ation and domestic incorporation of those norms in its legal
system.
B. The Australian Legal System
The most vivid image of Australia in the minds of most
Americans is that of the spectacular view of Sydney Harbor
and the Opera House. Both are beautiful and deservedly mem-
orable but they can also disguise the fact that Australia is a
whole continent with a land mass about the size of the United
9. Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works of
Sept. 9, 1886, done May 4, 1886 (Paris), revised Nov. 13, 1967 (Berlin), done Mar.
29, 1914 (Berne), revised June 2, 1948 (Brussels), July 14, 1967 (Stockholm), July
24, 1971 (Paris), 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
10. As a phenomenon, "globalization" is increasingly becoming a subject of sev-
eral multi-disciplinary studies. See, e.g., DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMA-
TIONS (1999); SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1998); GLOBAL-
IZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Kraig M. Hill et al.
eds., 1998).
11. See Samuel K. Murumba, Globalizing Intellectual Property: Linkage and
the Challenge of a Justice-Constituency, 19 U. PA. J. INVL ECON. L. 435, 438-43
(1998).
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States, spanning as many time-zones, and characterized by
great variety in climate and much else. Contrary to another
image, that of the famous paragon of irreverence, humor and
irony from the "outback--Mick Dundee-who, to use an Aus-
tralian judge's description, "romps through New York City like
a friendly alien ... leaving laughter in his wake," 2 Australia
is an ultra-modern country, and one of the most urbanized in
the world.
The Australian legal system is a creative synthesis of
American, English and local features, and has many resonanc-
es with the United States' legal system. Like the United
States, Australia has a federal system of government in which
powers are distributed between a federal government (called
the Commonwealth) and State and Territory governments
(there are six states-New South Wales, South Australia,
Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia-and
ten territories). Prior to 1900, the present Australian states
were a collection of six self-governing British colonies, the
ultimate power over which rested with the British Parliament.
The Australian Constitution, which is partly modeled on the
United States Constitution, took effect on January 1,
1901-the first day of the 20th century-and marked the birth
of the Australian nation." Like the U.S. Constitution, the
Australian Constitution divides legislative power between the
Commonwealth (Federal) Parliament (which like Congress is
bicameral and consists of the House of Representatives and the
Senate) and State Parliaments. The Constitution lists subjects
about which the Commonwealth can make laws, principally in
Sections 51 and 52, and these include taxation; defense; exter-
nal affairs; interstate and international trade; foreign, trading
and financial corporations; marriage and divorce; immigration;
bankruptcy; and interstate industrial arbitration. The list of
federal legislative powers also includes, in simple and straight-
forward terms, an open-ended power to make laws with respect
to "[clopyrights, patents of inventions and designs, and trade
12. Hogan v. Pacific Dunlop, Ltd., (1988) 12 I.P.R. 225, 230 (Gummow, J.)
(Austl.); Samuel Murumba, Character Merchandising in Australia Welcome Home
Wanderer, INTELL. PROP. F., Nov. 1990, at 10, 14-15.
13. For the federal structure and the antecedent federal movement, see the
excellent and lucid account in MICHAEL COPER, ENCOUNTERS WITH THE AUSTRALIAN
CONSTITUTION 49-102 (1987).
20001
BROOK. J. INTL L.
marks."'4 Matters that, like in the United States, traditionally
fall under the common law-for instance, much of the criminal
law, contracts, tort, property, and unfair competition law-all
fall within the legislative competence of the States though the
Commonwealth Parliament has sometimes used an ingenious
combination of several of its powers to encroach on state au-
tonomy in these fields. An example of such ingenious erosion is
the Trade Practices Act 1974, in which the notion of "deception
and misleading conduct" has virtually led to a federal takeover
of the passing-offlunfair competition field. 5 A state parlia-
ment, on the other hand, can make laws on any matters of
relevance to that state.
The federal structure in Australia imposes upon the na-
tional parliament constraints similar to those imposed on the
U.S. Congress. Those constraints, however, are attenuated by
two features of the Australian system. The first feature is the
absence, in the Australian Constitution, of the equivalent of
the Bill of Rights found in the United States Constitution
which prevents a legislature from passing laws that infringe
certain basic freedoms and rights such as freedom of speech. 6
This feature, together with the open-ended power to legislate
with respect to copyright, patents and trademarks, gives the
Australian National Parliament much greater latitude to make
laws relating to intellectual property. The second feature is
more fundamental. Although Australia has a federal system
similar to, and modeled on that of the United States, it also
has elements of the British Westminster-style parliamentary
system under which the Prime Minister and his or her govern-
ment belong to the political party commanding a majority of
seats in the House of Representatives. This means that apart
from the federal constraints on its legislative powers we have
just observed, the government/party in power has an unfet-
tered ability to push through its legislative program. A major
14. AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, § 51 (xviii).
15. Trade Practices Act, 1974 (Austl.).
16. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
[Vol. XXVI: 1
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part of the current government's program is Australia's digital
agenda.
III. AUSTRALIA'S DIGITAL AGENDA
Australia has embarked on one of the most ambitious
legislative programs in its history; this program is aimed at
creating norms for life in the digital domain. It began in ear-
nest in the mid-1990s and has gathered increased momentum
in the wake of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) Diplomatic Conference on Copyright's adoption in
December 1996 of two important treaties: the WIPO Copyright
Treaty,'7 and the WIPO Performance and Phonograms Trea-
ty." The momentum for law making in the digital domain
was given a further boost by the advent of electronic commerce
in which the Australian government sees substantial benefits
for consumers-for instance, greater convenience, increased
choice, lower prices, more information on products, ability to
personalize products and improved after-sales services-as well
as for Australian business. But the Australian legislative pro-
gram to regulate the digital domain is also part of a wider
public discourse involving a diverse group of organizations
ranging from law reform bodies to copyright owners' organiza-
tions to academics and private individuals.
The scope of any legislative program for an area as wide
and complex as the digital domain must be broad and complex,
and the present Australian program is both. As well as intel-
lectual property and transactional law, the program has also
encompassed, or may soon encompass, privacy9 and data pro-
tection, consumer protection, and includes a much-criticized
Internet censorship regime designed to forestall the availabili-
ty of certain sexually explicit materials on the Internet.0 In
17. World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996,
36 I.L.M. 65 [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty].
18. World Intellectual Property Organisation Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WIPO Phonograms Treaty].
19. As to the adverse impact of the widespread silent collection of personal
information in cyberspace on deliberative democracy and some solutions, see Paul
M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1609 (1999).
20. See Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Act, 1999 (Austl.);
Christopher Kendall, Australia's New Internet Censorship Regime: Is This Progress?
(visited Jan. 24, 2000) <http//www.law.murdoch.edu.au/dtjl/ar-
ticle/volll.3/kendallDTJL13.html>.
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this paper, however, it is only the intellectual property and
transactional aspects which will be my central focus.
A. Amendments to the Australian Copyright Act 1968
The intellectual property plank of Australia's recent initia-
tives to regulate the digital domain consists of a package of
amendments to her principal copyright legislation, the Copy-
right Act 1968.21 The most important of these relate to protec-
tion of computer programs, limitation of Internet service
providers' liability for contributory and "authorization" in-
fringement, prohibition of tampering with technological copy-
right protection measures and electronic copyright manage-
ment systems, and, most saliently, the new right for copyright
owners of "communication to the public."" The first two re-
strict the scope of the copyright owner's rights; the latter two
expand them.
1. Amendment to Provisions Relating to Computer Programs
and the Liability of Internet Service Providers
The Copyright Amendment (Computer Programs) Act 1999"
restricts the reproduction right of the owner of a copyright in a
computer program by allowing certain acts to be done by the
owner of a physical copy of the program. All these acts are
already privileged under U.S. copyright law, and some are
privileged in Europe and the United Kingdom as well. The acts
that now do not constitute copyright infringement include:
reproduction made in the course of running a copy of the pro-
gram for the purposes for which the program was designed,
reproduction for the purpose of making back-up copies of the
program, reproduction for the purpose of making interoperable
products, reproduction or adaptation for the purposes of cor-
recting errors in the program, and reproduction for the purpose
of studying the unprotectable ideas behind the program and
the way in which it functions. What is noteworthy about their
rendition in the Australian copyright amendments, and of
particular relevance to the discussion of the possibility of ex-
panding the copyright owner's rights by contract under UCITA,
21. Copyright Act, 1968 (Austl.).
22. Id.
23. Copyright Amendment (Computer Programs) Act, 1999 (Austl.).
[Vol. =XV:1
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as discussed below,' is that many of these privileges given to
owners of the physical copy embodying the program cannot be
excluded by contract. Section 47H provides that "[ain agree-
ment, or a provision of an agreement, that excludes or limits,
or has the effect of excluding or limiting, the operation of sub-
section 47B(3), or section 47C, 47D, 47E or 47F, has no ef-
fect." ' Some of the corresponding privileges in the United
Kingdom and Europe-the liberty to make necessary back-up
copies and to decompile a program for a permitted pro-
gram-are similarly not excludable by contract.
Immunizing Internet service providers against liability for
authorizing infringement and contributory liability arising out
of provision of their services is another feature of the recent
changes. Following a decision of Australia's highest court, the
High Court of Australia," holding a carrier liable for copy-
right infringement for the playing of music-on-hold by its sub-
scribers to their telephone clients despite the fact that the
carrier had no control in determining the content of the music
played, Internet service providers expressed concern about
similar liability. In response, the Copyright Amendment (Digi-
tal Agenda) Bill 199927 like the U.S. Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act of 1998,28 circumscribes the liability of Internet ser-
vice providers for transmitting or making available copyrighted
works on the Internet.
2. Technological Measures and the Right to Communicate to
the Public
In response to the WIPO treaties already mentioned, Aus-
tralia has enacted provisions in the Copyright Amendment
(Digital Agenda) Bill 1999 designed both to dissuade tamper-
ing with technological protections of copyrighted works or with
information management systems, and to provide copyright
owners with a brand new right-that of communicating their
24. See infra Part III(B) & (C).
25. Copyright Amendment (Computer Programs) Act, 1999, sched. 1, § 47H
(Austl.).
26. Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Australasian Performing Rights Ass'n, Ltd. (1997) 38
I.P.R. 294 (Austl.).
27. Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Bill, 1999 (Austl.).
28. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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works to the public. The "anti-tampering" provisions protect
two kinds of technological measures: measures that bar access
or prevent copies from being made, and electronic rights man-
agement systems. The latter regulate, monitor, and record the
use of copyrighted material and are expected to bring much
efficiency to online trading of copyrighted material. These
provisions originate from the WIPO treaties and have counter-
part developments in the United States 9 and in the United
Kingdom."
But the centerpiece of proposed changes to Australian
copyright legislation is the new right of communication to the
public which the changes give copyright owners. The impetus
for the new right was also the WIPO treaties mentioned above.
To understand the full significance of the new right, however,
it is helpful to know something about the range and scope of
the other exclusive rights which the Australian Copyright Act
1968 gives copyright owners. The Act gives copyright owners
(depending on the nature of the subject matter) the traditional
basic rights of "reproduction in a material form" (the phrase is
"tangible medium" in the United States), publication (distribu-
tion) adaptation (in the United States "preparation of deriva-
tive works") and public performance. The Australian Act also
includes the exclusive right to "broadcast" certain works and
the right to transmit them to subscribers to a diffusion service,
but does not include the right of display for most works under
the U.S. Copyright Act.
There was some doubt in Australia and elsewhere as to
whether the traditional reproduction, publication, broadcast or
diffusion rights could extend to uploading a work to the
Internet where it could be viewed or browsed by others. It was
thought that the reproduction right might not apply since
uploading this might not be regarded as a reproduction in "a
material form" (tangible medium). A similar problem might
confront the publication (distribution) right. On the other
hand, the broadcast and diffusion rights, though not tied to
tangible embodiment, are "technology-specific" and may well be
regarded as not extending to the Internet. For this reason, the
Australian Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Bill 1999
29. See id.
30. See W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE
MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 504-05, 538-48 (4th ed. 1999).
[Vol. XXVI:I100"
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adopts the right of "communication to the public" contained in
Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty.3 The technology-
neutral right of "communication to the public" not only sub-
sumes the technology-specific non-interactive forms of trans-
mission such as broadcasting or distribution to a diffusion
service and will therefore replace and extend both the "broad-
cast" and "diffusion" rights above, but will also encompass the
making available of copyrighted material online where others
may access or download it.
Australia will thus be at the forefront of countries adopt-
ing the WIPO-inspired right of communication to the public to
deal with the problem of unauthorized uploading of copyright-
ed material on the Internet and has been criticized for running
ahead of its competitors in rushing to introduce this broad
right.32 It is instructive to contrast Australia's bold approach
here with the measures adopted in the comparable jurisdic-
tions of the United Kingdom and the United States. In the
United Kingdom, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act
1988"3 defines "copying a work" to include storing it in any
medium including "the making of copies which are transient or
are incidental to some other use of the work."34 Uploading
copyrighted material to the Internet would, therefore, be with-
in the ambit of the copyright owner's reproduction right."
There were bills designed to deal with the problem in the U.S.
Congress but they were abandoned in the face of criticisms
alleging excessive copyright protection at the expense of the
"benefits to be derived from Internet access."36 But there is
ample academic 7 and judicial" opinion that even in the ab-
31. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 17, art. 8; see also WIPO Phonograms
Treaty, supra note 18, art. 14 ("right of making phonograms available to the pub-
lie").
32. See William A. Van Caenegem, Copyright, Communication and New Tech-
nologies, FED. L. REV. (visited Apr. 3, 2000) <http/www.law.anu.edu.au/pub-
lications/flr/vol23no2/FederalLawReviewWiliamAva.html>.
33. Copyright, Design and Patents Act, 1988, § 17(11) (Eng.).
34. CORNISH, supra note 30, at 510.
35. Cornish observes that the 1988 Act "thereby pushes the notion of
'reproduction' to the very boundary of passing uses and approaches those associat-
ed with performance: some forms of random access memory (RAM) involve only
fleeting retention of computerised information." Id. at 510 n.16.
36. ROBERT A. GOImAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT 550 (5th ed. 1999).
37. See id. at 549-52.
38. See Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993);
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sence of an express statutory provision to that effect, uploading
copyrighted material onto the Internet constitutes distribution
of it within the meaning of § 106(3) of the U.S. Copyright Act
of 1976.
Neither the new right of communication to the public fa-
vored by Australia nor the enhanced reproduction right in the
United Kingdom or the distribution right in the United States
solves all problems pertaining to availability and transmission
of copyrighted works in the digital domain. Two clusters of
inadequacies-one to do with fundamental policy, the other
with technical aspects of the digital domain which may put
certain acts beyond these measures-have been identified. The
policy problem involves the question whether browsing materi-
al on the Internet should constitute infringement as the ex-
panded notion of reproduction in a tangible medium embracing
transient fixation in the computer's random access memory
(RAM) seems to make it. 9 While this question is still in doubt
in many places, the Australian proposals for a broad right of
communication to the public address this problem by including
welcome exceptions for temporary copies made in the course of
the technical processes of making or receiving communication.
This exception is intended to include browsing of copyrighted
material online.
The technical inadequacy was recently identified by Pro-
fessor Pendleton, Deputy Director of the Asia Pacific Intellectu-
al Property Law Institute.4" This consists, in part, of the un-
certainties surrounding the reach of the new "making avail-
able" right and especially whether it extends to the linking of
sites. If one connects a file server that has a copyrighted work
on it to a publicly accessible network like the Internet, he or
she would clearly be infringing the "making available" right.41
But linking a file server containing copyrighted material on it
from one publicly accessible site on the Internet to another site
on the Internet would probably not constitute infringement of
Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
39. See Michael D. Pendleton, Reforming Copyright for the Digital
Age-Everyone's Horse on the Wrong Course, 4 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J.L. (Dec.
1997) (visited Apr. 3, 2000) <http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/is-
sues/v4n4/pendle44.html>.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 2.
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the new right since the material linked would already be
"available to the public through an alternative route."42 There
may be similar problems with respect to the English and
American reliance on a more expansive interpretation of "re-
production in a material form" (tangible medium) to include
transient reproductions in the computer's RAM memory where
"virtual documents" are involved,43 or where a work is dis-
persed into many portions that may be reassembled at their
destination," but the precise problems there are beyond the
scope of this paper.
B. The ContractlIP Interface: The Internet and Electronic
Commerce in Australia
There are two prongs to the contract/intellectual property
interface in the context of recent Australian legislative initia-
tives for the digital domain. The first relates to measures de-
signed to regulate and facilitate electronic commerce; the sec-
ond to the use of contractual terms to modify and, in most
cases, augment or supplement traditional intellectual property
rights.
Australian legislative and policy initiatives relating to
electronic commerce need to be seen against the background of
the role of electronic commerce in Australia. According to the
Australian Bureau of Statistics, 5.5 million adults accessed the
Internet in the 12 months ending in May 1999, but only
650,000 of them used the Internet to purchase products or
services for their private use.45 In the United States, on the
other hand, 38 percent of households connected to the Internet
are engaging in online shopping.46 In light of these figures,
one of the objectives of government initiatives in this area is to
craft a policy framework designed to address the factors inhib-
42. Id. (citing Macmillan & Blakeney, Internet and Communications Carriers
Liability, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 11 (1998)).
43. Id.
44. See GOMIAN & GINSBURG, supra note 36, at 417. As to when components
remain dispersed, see id. at 417-420; Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publish-
ing Co. 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998).
45. See Australian Government Treasury, A Policy Framework for Consumer
Protection in Electronic Commerce § 1.1 (The Economic and Social benefits of Elec-
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iting the Australian consumer's reluctance to engage in elec-
tronic commerce." The government believes that Australian
consumers and businesses ought to embrace electronic com-
merce in order to reap its social and economic benefits. " To
that end, both federal and state governments in Australia are
engaged in legislative initiatives to regulate electronic com-
merce and give consumers and businesses greater confidence
about its benefits. "
A principal initiative on this point is the recently passed
Australian Electronic Transactions Act 1999.5" This Act,
which adopts the UNCITRAL model of electronic signatures,
has been hailed as a well-drafted piece of legislation but criti-
cized for adopting the view that, due to the kind of federal
constitutional limitations familiar to U.S. scholars, could only
apply to Commonwealth (Federal) laws, and only serve as a
model for the State legislatures to pass similar laws if they so
wished.5 As already mentioned, other legislative initiatives
proposed for Australia or the United States relate to, among
others, privacy and data protection that are beyond the scope
of the present discussion.
C. An Australian Perspective on UCITA and its Predecessor
UCC Article 2B
The most dramatic U.S. development concerning the con-
tract/IP interface is the Uniform Computer Information Trans-
actions Act (UCITA) approved and recommended for enactment
in all States by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) at its 1999 annual meeting in
Denver, Colorado.52 UCITA, which in its former life was pro-
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. These benefits are emphasized in the Report of the Information Industries
Task Force, The Global Information Economy: The Way Ahead, in July, 1997. See
Melissa de Zwart, Electronic Commerce: Promises, Potential and Proposals, 21 U.
NEW S. WALES L.J. (visited Apr. 3, 2000) <http'l/www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/uns-
wlj/thematicd1998/vol2lno2/dezwart.html>.
50. The Commonwealth Electronic Transactions Bill 1999 which was passed by
the Senate on November 25, 1999 received Royal Assent on December 10, 1999 to
become the Electronic Transactions Act 1999.
51. See Leif Gamertsfelder, The Commonwealth Electronic Transactions Bill
1999: Ailments and Antidotes, J. INFO. L. & TECH. (visited Apr. 3, 2000)
<http://www.law.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/99-1/gamertz.html>.
52. Annual Conference Meeting in its One-Hundred-and-Eighth Year in Den-
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posed Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code, is the most
comprehensive attempt to adapt contract principles to the
digital domain. The law of contract is the vehicle through
which licensing intellectual property occurs, but in the United
States, as in Australia,53 there is no comprehensive federal
law of licensing.' Consequently, each State in the United
States, as in Australia, and other countries, may come up with
its own response to UCITA.55 Despite this limitation, UCITA
and its predecessor UCC Article 2B have attracted a massive
wave of critical attention and debate not only in the United
States" but also in Australia57 and Europe.58
UCITA is a detailed and comprehensive legislative propos-
al and some of its provisions are desirable. Nor is what has
drawn most fire in the United States and in Australia the fact
that intellectual property rights can be expanded or eliminated
altogether by a freely negotiated contract, nor that the law
relating to "information products" needs to be different from
that applicable to "tangible products."59 As already mentioned,
contract has always been the faithful vessel for the transmis-
sion-by assignment, license or security interest-of rights and
interests in intellectual property in the United States, Europe
ver, Colorado July 23-30, 1999.
53. See the earlier discussion on the limitations of the Australian Electronic
Transactions Act 1999, supra Part III(B)(1).
54. See KENNETH L. PORT ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 316 (1999).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, International Information Transactions: An
Essay on Law in an Information Society, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 5 (2000); Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, UCITA in the International Marketplace: Are we about to Export
Bad Innovation Policy?, 26 BROOK. J. INTL L. 49 (2000). There have been other
symposia on the issue. See, e.g., Symposium: Intellectual Property and Contract
Law in the Information Age: The Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial
Code on the Future of Transactions in Information and Electronic Commerce, 13
BERKELY TECH. J. 809 (1998); Symposium: Licensing in the Digital Age, 36 HOUS.
L. REV. 1 (1999).
57. See, for instance, the recent Brisbane conferences discussed in Lionel
Bently, Copyright's Futures: To Expand or Contract?, DIGITAL TECH. L.J. (visited
Jan. 26, 2000) <http://wwwlaw.murdoch.edu.au/dtljarticles/voll.2/bently.html>; Gail
E. Evans & Brian F. Fitzgerald, Information Transactions Under UCC Article 2B:
The Ascendancy of Freedom of Contract in the Digital Millennium, U. NEW S.
WALES L.J. (visited Apr. 3, 2000) <http-/www.law.unsw.edu.au/pub-
lications/journalsunswlj/ecommerce/evans.html>.
58. See sources cited, supra note 8.
59. This is the raison d'etre for UCITA, according to Professor Nimmer, its
principal architect. Nimmer, supra note 6, at 1, 1-59.
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and Australia. As for the fundamental distinction between
norms governing tangible products and those concerned with
intangible information, this, too, is uncontroversially familiar
to intellectual property lawyers in all three jurisdictions,60
though pressing it too far with respect to essentially functional
"information" products such as computer programs risks revis-
iting the tough compromises surrounding the now worldwide
norm6' requiring that these works be granted copyright pro-
tection as literary works under the Berne Convention.62 The
principal bone of contention is the blessing UCITA gives to
"shrinkwrap" or "mass market" licenses usually found in the
plastic wrapping in which computer programs are sold. Apart
from UCITA and one or two court decisions,63 shrinkwrap li-
censes have run into serious difficulties including a cloud over
their very validity as a matter of contract law." Yet they may
contain terms that purport to virtually rewrite the rules of
60. See, for instance, Section 202 of the U.S. Copyright Act which provides
that:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any exclusive rights under a copyright, is
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is em-
bodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy
or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey
any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the
absence of any agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of
any exclusive rights under a copyright convey property rights in any
material object.
17 U.S.C. § 202 (1995).
61. The norm is enshrined in such important treaties as: Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 10(1), Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1994); 33 I.L.M. 1197
(1994). ("Computer programs, whether in source or object code, shall be protected
as literary works under the Berne Convention (1971)"; WIPO Copyright Treaty,
supra note 17, art. 4 ("Computer programs are protected as literary works within
the meaning of Article 2 of the Berne Convention"); North American Free Trade
Agreement, Dec. 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993); Council Directive
91/250/EEC on the legal protection of computer programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42.
62. Berne Convention, supra note 9. For the need, in a somewhat different
context, to treat computer programs and traditional literary works differently in
applying the idea/expression dichotomy, see Honorable Jon 0. Newman, New Lyr-
ics for an Old Melody: The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in the Computer Age, 17
CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 691 (1999).
63. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook,
J.); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook, J.),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997).
64. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Li-
censes, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995).
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torts and intellectual property6 5 by excluding liability on the
part of the software supplier while augmenting his or her in-
tellectual property rights or supplementing them with new
rights. This is not always bad. Such terms may usefully fill in
the gaps where intellectual property protection is desirable but
as yet unavailable, as in the case of database protection in the
United States which is the subject of legislative initiatives in
Europe66 and to some extent in Australia.67 The principal ob-
jection is the use of terms in these licenses to prohibit conduct
that is advisedly allowed by copyright norms-for instance
certain forms of reverse engineering and other acts that con-
stitute "fair use" in the United States or "fair dealing" in Aus-
tralia-thus destroying the delicate balance between the pri-
vate and the public domains that copyright in particular, and
intellectual property in general, have maintained over the
years.
Even if shrinkwrap licenses were to be generally enforced
by the courts, it may still be possible to object to individual
terms on grounds such as unconscionability, as UCITA itself
recognizes," or preemption. In Australia, and in Europe, how-
ever, there are also certain restrictions on the scope of the
intellectual property owner's rights which cannot be excluded
by contract.69 In any event, the enactment of UCITA's expand-
ed rights in Australia will encounter non-legislative opposition
as well. A new coalition of copyright consumers-The Austra-
lian Digital Alliance (ADA) launched on February 26, 1999
with the former Chief Justice of Australia, Sir Anthony Mason,
as its patron and with the widespread support of libraries,
universities, and computer firms that favor laws hospitable to
development of interoperable systems-will be on guard to
protect balanced copyright protection.
65. See id.
66. See Directive 96/9JEC of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the legal protection of databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20. See generally CORNISH,
supra note 30, at 352, 523-24.
67. See, for instance, the proposed legislation in the State of Victoria, Austra-
lia.
68. UCITA § 111.
69. See, for instance, the discussion of the Copyright Amendment (Computer
Programs) Act 1999, and the similarly unexcludable U.K. and European provisions,
supra Part III(A)(1).
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IV. ENTER CODE AND THE DEMISE OF INAPPROPRIABILITY
In his paper in this issue, Professor Nimmer makes the
point that intellectual property based objections to UCITA are
misplaced since many of the contractual arrangements it
makes possible may be dependant less on intellectual property
rights and more on access. A putative licensee may agree to
unfavorable terms in the license not out of a desire to use the
copyright program without infringement, but in order to gain
physical access to the program.0 At first blush, this sounds
counterintuitive. One of the premises upon which the entire
edifice of intellectual property law is based is that its subject
matter, information, is both valuable and not "appropriable" in
the sense of being physically fenced in and retained the way
one might a chattel or even land. Conventional wisdom is that
information is of value only in the marketplace, but once re-
leased there, it can easily be replicated and used by the whole
world.7 It is, to use an image Rochelle Dreyfuss used at the
symposium, like toothpaste: "you can squeeze it out of the
tube, but you can't squeeze it back in."72 Moreover, modern
digital technology not only makes it possible to make perfect
copies of a work at next to no cost; it also makes it easy to
disseminate the copies worldwide at the mere click of a mouse.
Without a system of intellectual property protection there
would be little incentive to invest in the production of informa-
tion products, and every reason to wait and copy. Intellectual
property law thus steps in to ensure that there is sufficient
incentive for production of valuable works to the benefit of the
whole society. Many of the recent changes in intellectual prop-
erty law are, indeed, premised on this conventional wisdom,
especially as it relates to the perceived heightened vulnera-
bility of legitimate copyright interests to the predatory ravages
of digital technology."
But Professor Nimmer is right about control of access. The
whole notion of information being inappropriable or impossible
to control physically in the digital age is increasingly outmod-
70. See Nimmer, supra note 56, at 5.
71. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED
DOCTRINES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6-7
(4th ed. 1997); Murumba, supra, note 11, at 446, 457-58.
72. Dreyfuss, supra note 56, at 49-50.
73. See LESSIG, supra note 7, at 125.
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ed. It is a relic of the short-lived, mythical era of what a lead-
ing Australian computer law scholar has dubbed "digital liber-
tarianism"74 which saw cyberspace as beyond regulation. The
emerging era, however, is that of cyberspace as super-regulat-
ed space, and much of that regulation will be regulation of
access largely implemented by computer code or features of the
architecture of the digital domain such as cryptography" and
"trusted systems."76 With perfect control of access, contract
can step in to prescribe the terms of access. The implications
for the traditional balance between the public and the private
domains are breathtaking. Here is a scenario, from Lawrence
Lessig's excellent book; the scenario involves a traditional
copyright work, a book, rather than software but it illustrates
the point well:
Today, when you buy a book, you may do anything with it.
You can read it once or one hundred times. You can lend it to
a friend. You can photocopy pages in it or scan it into your
computer. You can burn it, use it as a paperweight, or sell it.
You can store it on your shelf and never once open it.
Some of these things you can do because the law gives
you the right to do them-you can sell the book, for example,
because the copyright law explicitly gives you that right.
Other things you can do because there is no way to stop you.
A book seller might sell you the book at one price if you
promise to read it once, and at a different price if you want to
read it one hundred times, but there is no way for the seller
to know whether you have obeyed the contract...
But what if each of those rights could be controlled, and
each unbundled and sold separately? What if, that is, the
software itself could regulate whether you read the book once
or one hundred times; whether you could cut and paste from
it or simply read it without copying; whether you could send
it as an attached document to a friend or simply keep it on
your machine; whether you could delete it or not; whether
you could use it in another work, for another purpose, or not;
or whether you could simply have it on your shelf or have it
and use it as well?"
74. See Greenleaf, supra note 7.
75. Lessig calls encryption technologies "the most important technological
breakthrough in the last one thousand years." LESSIG, supra note 7, at 35.
76. Id. at 127-30.
77. Id. at 128.
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However, although perfect digital control of access to copy-
right works can be achieved through code or architecture, it is
in the final analysis amenable to regulation by law because its
effectiveness is dependent on law. An example of this law-de-
pendency is the set of provisions in recent WIPO-inspired Aus-
tralian, American, and European legislative initiatives for
prohibiting tampering with technological restrictions on access
to copyright works or with the copyright management systems
discussed above." Another is the private lawmaking through
contract discussed in the previous section, which is always
parasitic on background rules"9 and, of course, on public legal
institutions like the courts, for enforcement--an aspect not
always given its due by game-theoretic accounts of transaction-
al conduct.8 Both should be no less answerable to fundamen-
tal policy scrutiny than say intellectual property.
As for the resurgent neo-Kantian notion of autonomy
which underpins UCITA's sanction of almost unrestrained
private law making, it should be noted that this kind of "free-
dom," too, is only possible if embedded in a definite structure. I
can hardly think of a more vivid illustration of this than the
following image:
I will explain that liberty has a structure and this structure
implies both freedom and constraint of actions. The best
analogy is to a building. I used to regularly eat lunch in the
Sears Tower in Chicago. Every day I would see thousands of
persons, enough to populate a small town, moving in an ap-
parently chaotic or "disorderly" fashion throughout the build-
ing. They were there for countless purposes and were headed
for innumerable destinations: shops, restaurants, offices, the
observation "skydeck" from which on a clear day they could
view four states. Yet the freedom they exercised was struc-
tured by the tower itself, by its lobbies, its corridors, its stair-
ways, its escalators, its elevators. Imagine that the tower was
invisible and you could simply view the inhabitants, suspend-
78. See supra Part III(A).
79. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Is Coleman Hobbes or Hume (or Perhaps
Locke), in ANALYZING LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 117, 117 (Brian Bix
ed., 1998).
80. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
81. For a discussion of some of these issues, see DONALD P. GREEN & IAN
SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS
IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1994). On the useful concept of "embedded games," see
DOUGLAS BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 188-217 (1994).
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ed in space. To explain their movements you would have to
hypothesize the existence of a tower with floors, walls, eleva-
tors ....
The structure of Sears Tower surely constrains the be-
havior or "freedom" of its occupants. You cannot, for example,
take a single elevator directly from the 20th to 60th floor.
Instead you need to change elevators on the 34th
floor .... Yet the structure also permits thousands of persons
on a daily basis to pursue their disparate purposes for enter-
ing the building ....
Like a building, every society has a structure that, by
constraining the actions of its members, permits them at the
same time to act to accomplish their ends ....
V. THREE IMAGES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
DIGITAL DOMAIN
This discussion began with a sketch of three images of
what may be broadly described as intellectual property in the
digital domain: American, European and Australian. It is in-
structive to return to these three images for an illustration of
the macro-changes which the developments of the digital era
discussed above have brought about in each and in the
reconfigurations of the relationships between them.
Twenty-five years ago-back in pre-digital antiqui-
ty-Europe and the United States could be characterized as
occupying opposite poles of intellectual property protection.
Europe represented the strongest view of intellectual property,
seeing it as some kind of sacred thing-as a kind of inalienable
natural or human right. This view is still alive and reflected in
Professor Dessemontet's invocation of both the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights which affirms the right of everyone
"to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he
[or she] is the author,"3 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the same effect.'
82. RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE
OF LAW 2 (1998).
83. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 27(2), U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948).
84. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, art. 15(1)(c), 993 U.N.T.S. 3. See also American Declaration of the Rights
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By contrast, Anglo-American law, did not hold intellectual
property rights in such lofty or naturalistic regard. In the
United States, intellectual property rights had always been
regarded as an incontrovertibly utilitarian compromise, and
always predicated upon their benefit to society. In this weaker
view, intellectual property rights are seen not as an inalien-
able birth right but as a benefit granted by society for the
benefit of society. This non-naturalistic conception of intellectu-
al property is enshrined in the U.S. Constitution itself which
gives Congress power "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." 5 This utilitarian premise for the protection of
intellectual property rights is also reiterated in numerous
court opinions at the highest level as in Sony Corporation of
America v. Universal Studios:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special
private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors by the provision of a special reward ... .8
Utilitarian to the core. The substantive rights created by Con-
gress pursuant to its constitutional mandate were similarly
circumscribed-for instance, grant of copyright was subjected
to various formalities that kept the United States out of the
Berne Convention, the premiere copyright treaty for a century,
as did the much shorter copyright term under the 1909 Act.
Moreover, all rights granted by copyright law-were subjected to
an open-ended overriding privilege of "fair use" which has its
roots in uniquely American countervailing values such as free-
dom of expression.
Anglo-Australian intellectual property law has, on the
other hand, always steered a middle course between the two
polar streams above. As in the United States, the federal pow-
and Duties of Man, art. 13, OEA/Ser.IAV/II.23, Doc. 6 (1948); Murumba, supra,
note 11, at 444.
85. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.




er to legislate for intellectual property matters is found in the
Commonwealth (Federal) Constitution, but unlike its United
States' counterpart, the Australian Constitution does not im-
pose any teleological constraint or utilitarian calculus on the
rights the legislature may create under the intellectual proper-
ty power. Outside the constitution, the rationale for Anglo-
Australian intellectual property rights has always been under-
stood to be a mixture of the more flexible utilitarian calculus
similar to that which underpins U.S. intellectual property
rights and the more robust deontological or natural right ideol-
ogy more familiar on the European continent. In Anglo-Austra-
lian law, the rights of the copyright owner are also stronger by
dint of the absence of an open-ended fair use doctrine such as
that of the United States; the equivalent concept of fair deal-
ing is much narrower and applies to a carefully enumerated
list of acts.
Over the last twenty years, however, intellectual property
rights in the United States have been progressively strength-
ened by legislation to the point where they are equivalent to
those of Anglo-Australian law; in the digital domain, UCITA
and code may now take them well beyond this point. Moreover,
these stronger rights are now taking on a naturalistic garb;
UCITA itself rests less on any utilitarian conception and more
on that most neo-Kantian and neo-classical of conceptions:
autonomy. There is an unmistakable resistance in Australia,
and it seems in Europe, to a wholesale embrace of this super-
naturalistic view of intellectual property rights, whether it
comes in the guise of autonomy or code or both. It remains to
be seen whether it will withstand the more robust countervail-
ing values in the United States' Constitutional culture."
VI. CONCLUSION
At its core, this paper has been concerned with the emerg-
ing law relating to transactions in digital products and, to a
lesser extent, digital transactions involving all products. My
charge was to discuss this law from an Anglo-Australian per-
spective, and I have tried to take the stance of an observer
87. UCITA is likely to run into problems especially with among others, pre-
emption by Federal Trade Commission legislation. See PORT ET AL., supra note 54,
at 348-49.
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from the Antipodes looking at the trans-Atlantic debates. One
should not assume from this stance, however, that there is a
single "Australian perspective" any more than there is a single
European or American one; all that the geographical designa-
tion indicates here is a chosen point of intervention in a fasci-
nating comparative approach.
The principal theme of this paper has been the view that
lawmaking in the digital domain is not just about contract and
autonomy, or just about intellectual property, or just about
digital technology: it lies at the busy and complex intersection
of all three. The comments on UCITA and other matters above
should be seen in this light. In urging a cautious approach to
lawmaking at the intersection of code, contract and intellectual
property, however, the paper should not be taken as a generic
disposition in favor of weaker rights in information. The U.S.
intellectual property rights of 20 years ago, especially in the
copyright area, always struck me as inadequate; they still do
in many areas including those relating to databases and aes-
thetic designs of utilitarian objects. Nor should the paper be
taken to suggest that the issues of contention are always
straightforwardly between suppliers and consumers of informa-
tion products. Indeed, I agree with Professor Nimmer's view
that the large majority of transactions in this area are likely to
be between businesses, and consumer protection (except indi-
rectly through freer competition) may not be the salient fea-
ture.
But it is equally true that much of the opposition to stron-
ger rights in information has come from a significant section of
the software suppliers themselves. Although this may come as
a surprise at first, it ultimately reflects the dynamics of the
innovation process at the heart of intellectual property law,
and that law's delicate balance between the diametrically op-
posed goals of strong exclusive rights for innovators on the one
hand, and maximum public access to their innovations on the
other. In the end, however, both exclusion and access rest on
the same deep principle of encouraging innovation: exclusion
does it by providing incentive to innovators; access, by allowing
them to copy and build on the work of others. This is particu-
larly true in the software field where today's innovations are
quickly superceded by tomorrow's new ones.
The naturalistic transformation of exclusion into some
inalienable right jeopardizes the innovation potential of copy-
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ing recently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court itself." All
authors are also copiers, and build on the work of those who
have gone before: "The world goes ahead because each of us
builds on the work of our predecessors. 'A dwarf standing on
the shoulders of a giant can see further than the giant
himself."9 That is the balance between access and exclusion
which intellectual property in general, and copyright in partic-
ular, strives to maintain. We should not discard it lightly by
renaming knowledge "information," or relocating exclusivity in
contract and code rather than (or in addition to) intellectual
property.
88. See Feist Publications, Inc. -v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340
(1991):
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor may be
used by others without compensation. As Justice Brennan has correctly
observed, however, this is not "some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory
scheme." Harper & Row, 471 U.S., at 589 (dissenting opinion). It is,
rather, "the essence of copyright," ibid., and a constitutional requirement.
The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors,
but "[to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." Art. I, § 8, cl.
8. Accord, Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975). To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and
information conveyed by a work.
Id. at 349-50 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
89. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright 45 COLUM. L.
REV. 503, 511 (1945).
'2
